

Islamic Parties, Islamic Radicals and Democratization in Indonesia¹

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*“cause we all live under the same sun
We all walk under the same moon
Then why, why can't we live as one”
(Scorpions, Under the Same Sun)*

Abstract

The aim of my paper is to analyze the impact of Islamic parties' policies toward radical Islamic groups on democratic transition in Indonesia. I chose Islam and democratization because Islam is religion of Indonesian majority. Beside, Islam has also had significant influence in political history of Indonesia. This paper will be divided into two parts. Firstly, it will discuss about the concept of democracy then it continues with the second part to discuss about the main topic of this paper, the impact of Islamic parties' policies toward radical Islamic groups on democratic transition in Indonesia.

Key Words: *Islamic Parties, Radical Islam Groups, Democracy, Democratic Transition, Indonesia*

Abstraksi

Tujuan paper saya adalah hendak menganalisis pengaruh dari kebijakan partai-partai Islam terhadap kelompok-kelompok Islam radikal dalam era transisi demokrasi di Indonesia. Saya memilih Islam dan demokratisasi karena Islam merupakan agama mayoritas masyarakat Indonesia. Selain itu, Islam juga mempunyai pengaruh signifikan dalam sejarah politik Indonesia. Paper ini terbagi menjadi dua bagian. Bagian pertama, akan mendiskusikan tentang konsep demokrasi lalu dilanjutkan dengan bagian kedua yang mendiskusikan tentang topik utama paper ini, pengaruh dari kebijakan-kebijakan partai Islam terhadap kelompok-kelompok Islam radikal dalam transisi demokrasi di Indonesia.

Kata Kunci: *Partai-partai Islam, Kelompok Islam Radikal, Demokrasi, Transisi demokrasi, Indonesia*

¹ This paper was presented at Annual Conference on Taiwan's Southeast Asian Studies, Tamkang University, Taiwan, April 2011.

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Introduction

Concept of Democracy

Since the end of the Cold War, Democracy becomes an attractive idea around the world. All people: politicians, journalist, scholars, students, labors and others, talks about the idea of Democracy. These people sometime have their own definition about Democracy because democracy itself gives an opportunity for all individuals to express their own idea about anything.

However, even though Democracy gives such opportunity, in this paper, I will use more scientifically strict definition of Democracy. The definition of democracy can be found from many scholars' ideas. These ideas range from narrow to a broad and complex ones. Joseph Schumpeter is a proponent for the narrow conception. He defines democracy as a problem of election. A mechanism is given to the people to choose their leaders. In this conception, the people do not have control to the decision making process while the leaders do. If the people are disappointed about their leaders' policies, they can change their vote to another leader candidate in the next election.³ Schumpeter definition of Democracy is not suitable and enough for modern world because only gives very limited rights to the people. David Held is another scholar who is a defender of democracy. However, Held has a broad idea about democracy. He mixed his idea from 2 (two) big political traditions in history, Liberalism and Marxism. Despite, the broad definition is also the weakness of his idea because it makes difficult to measure the implementation of Democracy.⁴

In contrast, Robert A. Dahl offers more applicable conception of democracy. Dahl named his conception "Polyarchy". Dahl's concept focuses on the government ability to protect its citizens' preferences. To capture this ability, Dahl proposes 8 basic requirements that must be reached by the governments: freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support (votes), alternative sources of information, free and fair election, and institution for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.⁵

Steps toward Democracy

Democracy is an attractive idea. The attractiveness of Democracy is lying on 10 reasons:⁶

(1)Democracy helps to prevent government by cruel and vicious autocrats, (2)Democracy guarantees its citizens a number of fundamental rights that nondemocratic systems do not, and cannot, grant, (3)Democracy insures its citizens a broader range of personal freedom than any feasible alternative to it, (4)Democracy helps people to protect their own fundamental interest, (5)Only a democratic government can provide a maximum opportunity for persons to exercise the freedom of self-determination – that is, to live under laws of their own choosing, (6)Only a democratic government can provide a maximum opportunity for exercising moral responsibility, (7)Democracy fosters human development more fully than any feasible alternative, (8)Only democratic government can foster a relatively high degree of political equality, (9)Modern representative democracies do not fight wars with one another, (10)Countries with democratic government tend to be more prosperous than countries with non democratic government.

These 10 reasons have encouraged many societies around the world to fight against authoritarianism to build democratic regime, and have also encouraged many scholars to theorize the steps toward democracy (transition to democracy). Dankwart Rustow offers national unity as the background condition for democratic transition. He defined national unity as "the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservation as to which political

³ Georg Sorensen, *Democracy and Democratization: Process and Prospect in a Changing World*, 2nd, Colorado & Oxford: Westview Press, 1998, p. 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12

⁶ Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1998, pp. 44-61.

community they belong to.”⁷ National unity influences the result of democratic transition. If a crisis of national unity occurred and nation cannot solve it in democratic manner, the outcome is the fail of democracy merged with repression of the minority group or civil war.

The formation of national unity is unique in every nation. Every nation has its own time and way to build national unity. For example Japan and Sweden have had their national unity since prehistoric times, while others such as France just gain it centuries ago or Turkey since decades ago. Furthermore, geographic situation, intensification of social communication, the legacy of dynastic or administrative process of unification, or others can be the determinant factors creating national unity. The best national unity is when it is accepted by the people without question or is taken for granted.⁸

According to Rustow, there are 3 phases of democratic transition. It starts with preparatory phase. This phase is “characterized by a political struggle leading to the breakdown of the nondemocratic regime.”⁹ Then, it continues with decision phase. In this second phase a “clear cut elements of democratic order are established.”¹⁰ Finally, the consolidation phase “where the new democracy is further developed and, eventually, democratic practices become an established part of the political culture.”¹¹ The formation of national unity sometime can be overlap with these phases. For example, the formation of national unity in India began later after she had started the preparatory phase.¹²

Islamic Parties, Radical Islam and Democratization in Indonesia

Islam is one of the important elements in political life in Indonesia. Islam has been involved and has influenced political development in Indonesia since before independence. The influence of Islam in Indonesian politics can be seen through the controversy of *Piagam Jakarta* (Jakarta Charter). On June 1945, Indonesian leaders met and agreed about the contents of *Piagam Jakarta*. Those were: (1)*Ketuhanan dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya* (divinity with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law), (2)*Kemanusiaan yang adil dan beradab* (a just and civilized humanity), (3)*Persatuan Indonesia* (unite of Indonesia), (4)*Kerakyatan yang dipimpin oleh hikmat kebijaksanaan dalam permusyawaratan perwakilan* (people sovereignty lead by wisdom and representative’s consultative), (5)*Keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia* (social justice for all people of Indonesia).

However, soon after the agreement was reached people in Ambon and Minahasa rejected *Piagam Jakarta* and would decide to split from Indonesia if *Piagam Jakarta* was implemented. The point of rejection was the seven-word clause “*dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya*” (with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law). This situation forced the leaders to re-negotiate the contents of *Piagam Jakarta* and reached a new agreement that the “seven words” was deleted, but Indonesian president had to be a Muslim. However, until now some Muslims and Islamic organizations are still fighting to return the Charter to the original form. This is influenced by the disappointment of Islamic leader during the negotiation of *Piagam Jakarta* in 1945 because, for them, the compromise was not fair. Moreover, at that time they believed this new compromise just for temporary and would be re-discussed after the independence of Indonesia.¹³

⁷ Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model” in Lisa Anderson (ed.), *Transition to Democracy*, New York: Columbia University, 1999, p. 25-26.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁹ Sorensen, *Democracy and Democratization*, p. 45.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 41.

¹³ Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation*, Singapore: ISEAS, 2009, pp. 73-74.

Islamic Parties and Authoritarian System in Indonesia

Post-independence, Islam continued shaping Indonesian politics. Two important Islamic camps in this period were Modernists and Traditionalists. Modernist group was represented by Muhammadiyah and Masyumi, and traditionalist group was by Nahdlatul Ulama. Muhammadiyah¹⁴ and NU¹⁵ have a different strategy of involvement in Indonesian politics. Muhammadiyah is never being a political party, but its leaders are actively involved in politics by joining in political parties. In contrary, NU has been swung from social organization to political party and swung back again to social organization.

The political maneuvers of Modernists and Traditionalist in this period have led Indonesian politics toward authoritarian system. In the beginning, NU was a part of Masyumi, but then decided to withdraw and to build its own party. After 1949, young modernist politicians took over the control of Masyumi and modernized the party. This policy reduced significantly the power of advisory board that dominated by NU. This condition motivated NU leaders to decline from Masyumi. On the other hand, the number of Muhammadiyah members in Masyumi increased extensively after the modernization.¹⁶

After Election 1955,¹⁷ both groups were trapped in a political crisis. Masyumi was involved in rebellions in Sumatera and Sulawesi that were motivated by dissatisfaction with the Sukarno's centralized government. Unfortunately, the rebellion was defeated by Sukarno and Masyumi lost its influence in parliament to defend parliamentary system.¹⁸ At the same time, NU's endorsement for parliamentary system decreased. It is because its fear that PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia) could be a winner for the next election and endangered power position of *Kiai* (name for traditional Islamic clerics in Indonesia).¹⁹ On the other hand, Sukarno and the armed forces had a chance to propose authoritarian system as the solution for political crisis. Consequently, Sukarno was successful to change the political system to be authoritarian system named 'Guided Democracy' in 1959.²⁰

NU accepted this new system while Masyumi rejected, and brought it to be banned by Sukarno in 1960. Mietzner highlights "the difference in NU's and Masyumi's attitudes towards Guided Democracy contributed significantly to the consolidation of non-democratic rule."²¹ NU's reasons for its acceptance were "to ensure that Muslim interests were sufficiently represented, and that participation in the regime was necessary to control the expansion of the PKI."²²

However, it seems Sukarno's Guided Democracy was not satisfied Muslims. In the middle of 1960s, NU changed its position to oppose Sukarno and become Suharto's proponent as well as modernist students. The modernist group expected Suharto would end its political marginalization, while NU hoped for reward from Suharto over its involvement in destroying PKI. NU, in cooperation with the army, was an important player during the cleansing of PKI members. Mietzner states "in many cases, the army rounded up suspected communists, loaded them on trucks, and delivered them to a location where members of Muslim militia stood by to kill them."²³ Also, NU members in parliament played significant role to raise Suharto to the presidential position.²⁴

¹⁴ The Muhammadiyah was established in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta.

¹⁵ The NU was founded on January 31, 1926 as a reaction to the Muhammadiyah.

¹⁶ Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam*...., p. 76.

¹⁷ In this election, Masyumi gained 20.9% of the votes and NU (18.4%). Those gains made them sitting in the second and third places.

¹⁸ Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam*...., p. 77.

¹⁹ In the Election 1955, PKI gained 15.4% of the votes and put it on the fourth place.

²⁰ Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam*...., pp. 77-78.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

Islamic Parties and Radical Islam in the Post-Authoritarian Era

In the post-authoritarian era, Zachary Abuza divides Islamic groups in Indonesia into several types, based on their goals and tactics (table 1). In terms of goals, he ranges the spectrum from secular, pluralist and democracy to regional caliphate. In terms of tactics, he ranges the spectrum from non violence to terrorism/ paramilitary activity for revolution.²⁵ Then, he continues to divide 3 broad categories of Islamic groups:

1) Political Islam – political parties and national institutions (other than NU and Muhammadiyah, which are committed to Indonesia's existing political system and social order) that support a greater role for Islam in political and social life, including the implementation of sharia; 2) Militant Islam - radical groups, supported mainly by disaffected youth that engage in low-intensity conflict and that also support a greater role for Islam in Indonesian politics and social life; 3) Islamist terrorism – highly radical militant organization that use terrorist tactics to bring about radical political and social realignment.”²⁶

At the same time, Mietzner states there 3 different types of Islamic extremist groups in Indonesia, namely terrorist cells, “anti-vice” militias, and paramilitary groups that involved in religion-based horizontal conflicts.²⁷ The first group is mostly headed by the Islamic radicals who lived abroad and returned home in 1998, after the collapse of Suharto. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who lived in Malaysia for 17 years as an exile, is one of them. In 1972, co-founded with Abdullah Sungkar, he built Al-Mukmin boarding school in Ngruki, Central Java, Indonesia. Ba'asyir also headed *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI), an umbrella organization for terrorist cells in Indonesia and Southeast Asia.²⁸

²⁵ Zachary Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia*, London & New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 9-10.


²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 9-11.

²⁷ Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam....*, p. 281.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

Picture 1

Types of Islamic Groups in Indonesia



Source: Source: Zachary Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia*, London & New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 10.

“Anti-vice” militias are Islamic radicals that focus on to impose Islamic morals by using violent intimidation. *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI, Islamic Defenders front) is an example for this radical group. This organization is founded in 1998 in Southern Jakarta. Since its establishment, FPI is actively engaged in many violent raids on nightclubs, prostitution venues, and gambling facilities.²⁹

The third, paramilitary groups, is characterized by its paramilitary capabilities. These groups are provided to assist and to protect Muslims in conflicting area, such as religious conflicts in Poso and Maluku. *Laskar Jihad* (LJ) was a well-known group of this type.³⁰ On October 2002, *Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunah wal Jamaah*, an umbrella organization for LJ, decide to disperse LJ.

Both, the second and the third type of the groups, are used regularly and politically by some people to reach their interests, especially economic interest. Police and military, institutionally and personally, are the political user of these groups.³¹ In this regard, we can say then these groups are open and vulnerable to be used as political instrument by politicians.

Since pre-independence, the most problem for Islamists in Indonesia is an implementation of *sharia* (Islamic laws). All Indonesian Islamic groups; Islamic parties, Islamic organizations, Islamic radicals and Islamic terrorism, concern on ‘how to implement *sharia*’ in Indonesia. *Sharia* is not only their resemblance, but also the source of their disunity, mostly about the problem of ‘how to implement *sharia*’. However, to some extent, these groups give supports each other.

Islamic parties try to insert *sharia* to the government regulation as well as Islamic radicals. For example, in 2001, a vote for constitutional change was proposed by Islamic parties. The proposal offered parliament to accept the controversial 7 words of *Piagam Jakarta*. However, the proposal was rejected by parliament in a voting meeting. But, Abuza states ‘the vote itself was significant for the fact that it happen after debate had been ststified for 60 years.’³²

After lost in the vote, Islamic parties changed their tactics and won by inserting some Islamic issues into government regulations. The new education law obliges all school, either public or private, providing religion subject, hiring religion instructor and building praying room for Muslim students. Even, DPR (Indonesian parliament) drafted a “moral keeper” law that, for example, bans kissing in public space and criminalizes cohabitation.³³ Furthermore, in October 30, 2008 the parliament passed anti-pornography bill that sponsored by Islamic parties and Islamic radicals. This bill is regulating “erotic actions” and control women how to act in public space.

Next, In July 28, 2005, Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Ulamas’ Council of Indonesia)³⁴ released 11 *fatwas* that consist of 3 controversies:³⁵ First, those *fatwas* banned secularism, pluralism and religious liberalism. It is because, in MUI’s definition: 1) Secularism only put religion as the relationship between individual and God, while inter-human relations are not; 2) Pluralism sees every religion is equal and impossible for claiming one religion is true

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

³⁰ *Ibid.*,

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 282-283.

³² Abuza, *Political Islam.....*, p. 29.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

³⁴ MUI is the organization that consists of Islamic clerics and Muslim intellectuals that aims to reach the common goal of Islam in Indonesia.

³⁵ See Abuza, *Political Islam....* and also Agus Hadi Nahrowi, “Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: Helpful and Hinderling Aspects”, http://pluralism.org/research/reports/nahrowi/Pluralism_Indonesia.doc. Accessed November 9, 2010.

and others are wrong, and; 3) Religious liberalism is only based on “rational ways of thinking freely, not religious-based thinking.”³⁶ Second, declaring Ahmadiyah as prohibited organization because Ahmadiyah assumes Mirza Gulam Ahmad as the last prophet of Islam.³⁷ This belief is contrary with other Islamic sects’ belief that Muhammad is the final prophet. Third, declaring collective inter-religious prayer is *Haram* (forbidden), except the leader of the prayer is a Muslim. However, among these 11 *fatwas*, 7th *fatwa* is the most controversial because it says Islam is the only true religion and other religions are wrong. Also, some *ulamas* (Indonesian Islamic clerics), since 2003, have been trying to push parliament legislating a law to restrict Christians erecting new churches and doing their activities, obligate government to examine carefully every foreign aid for churches, and banning apostasy and cross-religion adoption.³⁸

All these political maneuvers then give energy for the radical groups, such as FPI and others, to hold violent and intolerant actions, namely close existing churches, ban Christians to build new churches, accuse people who have different ideas with them as infidel and intimidate them. Unfortunately, Islamic parties never give serious attention or strong response for their violently discriminative attitudes. Even some parties supported and allowed their actions.³⁹

There are two reasons why Islamic parties hold this kind of response. First, they use Islamic radical groups to gain votes in election and also need those radicals to support their Islamic agendas in parliament. For example, with their protests, these radicals supported Islamic parties to oppose Megawati as a women president candidate in election 1999, to pass anti-pornography bill and to encourage a vote for inserting 7 words of *Piagam Jakarta*.

Second, some leaders of Islamic parties have close relations with the leaders of Islamic radical groups. For example, Hamzah Haz, a former leader of *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (United Development Party, PPP) and Ahmad Sumargono, one of the leaders of *Partai Bulan Bintang* (Crescent Moon and Star Party, PBB) have close and good relations with Jafar Umar Thalib, the former leader of Laskar Jihad (LJ).⁴⁰ Thalib, once, said, “We don’t like *Pancasila* because it means that Islam is the same as other religions. This is not so. We believe that Islam is the highest and the best.”⁴¹ His good relations with

³⁶ Agus Hadi Nahrowi, *Ibid.*

³⁷ The recent case of violence against Ahmadiyah followers was in Cikeusik, Banten on February 6, 2011. It caused 3 Ahmadiyah followers died and wounded others. After the incidence PPP (United Development Party), an Islamic party, said that the incidence was caused by the government’s indecision to disband or to ban Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. However, another Islamic party, PKS (Prosperous and Justice Party) said that it happened because the government failed to avoid the incidence and doubted the Police’s performance. The Party also suspected that there was a political scenario behind the incident.

PKS’ statement is an interesting fact because in 2008 PKS leader supported the government to disband Ahmadiyah. It seems that there are factions inside the Party. One is more moderate and other is hardliner. Moreover, the moderate faction in 2010 released a statement that the government has to protect Ahmadiyah as well as other religions or beliefs.

Another interesting fact is on February 9, after the incidence, the president called for the disbandment of mass organization that have often incited violence and acted as hate-mongers. However, at the same day, FPI (Islamic Defender Front), a hardliner organization, announced that they will launch sweeping raids against Ahmadiyah followers if the government does not disband Ahmadiyah within 24 hours. This statement shows that the government has been lost its power against Islamic hardliners.

³⁸ See Abuza, *Political Islam*..., p. 86.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 89 & 95.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 69. Also, Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 2003, pp.191-192

⁴¹ Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam*..., p. 69.

Indonesia politicians made Thalib only suffered for light sentence for his violent activities in Maluku conflict.

Implication to Democratization

Islamic parties' policy toward Islamic radicals can be differentiated into four scenarios in which each scenario has its own implication to democracy (table 2). In first scenario, Islamic parties reject violence of Islamic radicals and also refuse radical ideas of Islam. Consequently, secularism and democracy will develop healthy. This is the ideal scenario.

Table 2
4 Scenarios of Islamic Parties' Policy toward Islamic Radicals in Indonesia

Scenario 1 Rejecting violence Refusing radical ideas of Islam	Scenario 2 Rejecting violence Promoting radical ideas of Islam
Scenario 3 Ignoring violence Refusing radical ideas of Islam	Scenario 4 Ignoring violence Promoting radical ideas of Islam

In second scenario, Islamic parties reject violence, but promote radical ideas of Islam. The implication of this scenario is secularism will decrease because Islamic militants will join in Islamic parties and promoting their Islamic agendas through parliament. Hence, Non-Muslims will feel to be discriminated by the government.

In third scenario, Islamic parties ignore violence of Islamic militants, but refuse radical ideas of Islam. The implication of the third scenario is Islamic radicals will be frustrated because their Islamic agendas are rejected by Islamic parties and also government. However, because of Islamic parties ignoring the violence, they will use violence to force government and Islamic parties to accept their agendas. Consequently, violence done by these groups will increase and be also potential to grow to religious conflict. In this condition secularism will exist but is hard to develop.

In fourth scenario, Islamic parties ignore violence of these militants and also promote radical ideas of Islam. This is the worst scenario. In this situation secularism and democracy will decrease. Otherwise, sectarianism and cultural exclusion will increase. Segregation among people, especially among different religious adherents, will also increase. Violence will increase as well because the militants groups get constitutional reason to force people to obey what they want. Religious conflict is potentially to happen. Even, disintegration is possible to appear, mostly in place where secessionist group still exist, such as Papua.

In Suharto's era institutionalization of violence and cultural exclusion were two important aspects to understand how the government responding secessionist movement in Papua.⁴² Institutionalization of violence means that military approach became a method to solve all state's problems. Suharto administration saw those who opposed the government had to be destroyed. Cultural exclusion means that Suharto's administration managed the country by creating culture of unity, harmony and obedience. There was no place for diversity or disagreement. In this regard, the government repressed Papuan

⁴² Richard Chauvel, "Violence and Governance in West Papua" in Charles A. Coppel, *Violent Conflicts in Indonesia*, London & New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 183.

resistance and thwarted their local culture and identity. Jacques Bertrand explains Indonesian government in its effort to integrate Papua as a part of Indonesia implemented policies that repressed Papuans to express their culture in public.⁴³ This factor then increased Papuans' motivation for separation and independence. Besides, Indonesian government also launched economic policies that only benefited people in Jakarta and foreign company.

However, in post-Suharto's era there were changes in government's approach toward Papua. Indonesia government was more accommodative toward Papuans. Habibie's administration held a meeting with a large Papuan delegation. Hereafter, Wahid's administration permitted Papuan people to fly their flag, the 'Morning Star' (*Bintang Kejora*), changed the name the province name from Irian Jaya to Papua, and gave substantial fund for them to hold Papuan congress.⁴⁴ Then in 2001, Megawati's administration gave special autonomy status to Papua. However, the status of special autonomy was not fully be accepted by Papuans. Until now protests rejecting the status of special autonomy still happen.⁴⁵

If Islamic parties do scenario four, I see that they potentially replicate what Suharto did during his era, namely cultural exclusion and violence. Promoting radical ideas of Islam into state regulation is potential to discriminate Papuan cultures because some of the Papuan cultures are different with Islamic rules. For example, Papuan traditional clothes are totally different with Islamic rules. It will create an image to Papuan people that Indonesian government is discriminating them.

Typically, Islamic radicals are anti-dialog and anti-compromise. Anything that is different with their ideas seen as enemy and enemy has to be destroyed. In this regard, if radical ideas of Islam become state regulation, Islamic radicals will have constitutional reasons to repress Papuans people and their culture.

Those attitudes are similar with Suharto's. Suharto saw those who were different with him as enemies. There was no dialog and compromise with enemies. Enemies had to be destroyed. In Suharto's era, this kind of policies had caused Papuans' feeling to be independence rose. So, if this kind of policies is also done by Islamic radicals, it will reinforce Papuans to feel that they are different from other parts of Indonesia and would motivate them to support independence movement.

Since 2000, Islamic radical named *Laskar Tabligh* have been established in Papua. Previously, this radical's name is *Laskar Jihad*, but later it changed its name to be *Laskar Tabligh*. LJ's ideology is conservative. It opposes democracy and believes on Zionist and Christian conspiracy theories. This group is also sectarian. During Maluku conflicts, LJ described Christian-Maluku people as *kafir harby* (belligerent infidels). LJ and also some other radicals are nationalist. They are anti-separatist groups and believe that separatism in Indonesia caused by global conspiracy of Christians to weaken Muslims.⁴⁶ Moreover, LJ has close relation with green faction in Indonesian military.⁴⁷ Kingsbury says in his book *The Politics of Indonesia* that some military officers trained military training for LJ members.⁴⁸ In this regard, LJ can be used by this military faction to fight against pro-

⁴³ Jacques Bertrand, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia*, Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 2004, p. 152.

⁴⁴ Richard Chauvel, "Violence and Governance...", p. 186.

⁴⁵ "Masyarakat Papua Menolak Otonomi Khusus", *Pikiran Rakyat Online*, July 9, 2010, <http://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/node/117493>. Accessed January 2, 2011.

⁴⁶ Damien Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia*, 3rd edition, Melbourne: Oxford Press, 2005.

⁴⁷ Indonesian military is separated by two factions, green faction that is Islamic-Nationalist and red faction that is secular-nationalist.

⁴⁸ Kingsbury, *The Politics of...*

independence Papuans. Moreover, LJ has been proven to be active to fight against pro-independence Papuans.⁴⁹

If scenario four happens and the Papuan's feeling of independence increases, LJ's involvement in fighting against pro-independence Papuan movement can increase religious sentiment and then causes separatism in Papua to mingle with horizontal conflict that is a combination of religious conflict and indigenous people-settlers conflict. It is because most of settlers in Papua are Muslims, while the indigenous people are Christian or animist. Sentiment of indigenous-settlers has existed in Papua, especially in Papuan rebels. The economist wrote in their report about statement from two Papuan rebels, "The Indonesian shopkeeper, the soldier and the staff of Freeport are all our enemies. We want to kill them and the mine should be shut... When we achieve independence, we shall kick out the immigrants and Freeport..."⁵⁰

Moreover, on 6 October 2000 an incident happened in Wamena, Papua. During this incident 37 people were killed (most of them were settlers), 89 people were injured, more than 13,000 people had to leave their home and 83 people were arrested. Chauvel says that the importance of the incident is not the number of victims, but it showed a conflict between Papuans and Indonesian settlers and also among Papuans.⁵¹ This incident then raised suspicion among Papuans that security authorities attempted "to shift the dynamic of political conflict from the demand for independence to one of ethnic tension."⁵²

Conclusion

Indonesian new-born democracy has given new opportunities for Indonesian people to live better. However, there is still a danger for democracy to develop in Indonesia. Political maneuver done by Islamic parties that ignoring violent and discriminative action held by Islamic radicals can endanger that new democracy to grow into its mature condition. Indonesian experiences before New Order period have shown that wrong maneuvers taken by Islamic parties had led the country to live in authoritarian systems that harmed Indonesian people and Indonesian Muslims as well. In this regard, I think it is very better if Islamic parties in Indonesia to reject Islamic radicals' violence and harmonizing their Islamic ideas with the principles of democracy.

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⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ "Papua: Indonesia's Last Frontier", *The Economist*, June 3, 2010, <http://www.economist.com/node/16274331>. Accessed January 7, 2011.

⁵¹ Richard Chauvel, "Violence and Governance...", p. 188.

⁵² *Ibid.*

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